United Nations A/68/746–S/2014/89

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
11 February 2014
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 110
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Identical letters dated 10 February 2014 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the following information:

Armed terrorist groups have committed yet another massacre, this time in the village of Ma'an, Hamah governorate, killing entire families and scores of women, children, the elderly and disabled persons, and destroying several houses, one after the other. The terrorists had attacked this village repeatedly in the recent past and displaced its population in implementation of regional and international plans aimed at undermining the unity of the Syrian people and rending its social fabric.

This massacre is yet further evidence that the terrorists and those who support them are continuing to kill Syrians unabated and proof of their blatant disregard of all efforts to arrive at a credible political process that can end the systematic destruction by these terrorist groups of the Syrian people, its infrastructure and its cultural achievements.

Those who champion counter-terrorism have ignored for too long this malignant threat to Syria, neighbouring countries and the States of the world. They have chosen to use the situation in Syria as a means of making cheap political gains that forward their plans in the region, particularly their desire to dominate the region and its peoples and their capacities. Syria emphasizes that those States that are training, arming, funding and harbouring terrorists and helping them to enter the country and that are marshalling their media to agitate for what they call jihad are responsible for the spread of terrorism and the direct threat it poses to security and peace at the regional and international levels.

Syria calls on the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Security Council to condemn strongly and without delay this massacre and the terrorists who committed it and those who are supporting terrorists and the crimes they are committing in Syria. Now is the moment of truth and clarity and the time to

14-23220 (E) 130214 140214

Please recycle

implement the Security Council resolutions concerning counter-terrorism, particularly resolution 1373 (2001). The killings being committed by armed terrorist groups in Syria prove once again that the fundamental task before the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, is to stop violence and counter-terrorism wherever it occurs.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 110 on measures to eliminate international terrorism, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mazen **Adi**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations A/68/747

General Assembly

Distr.: General
12 February 2014

Original: English

Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 44
Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)

Letter dated 10 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with instructions received from the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 3 January 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Argentina to the United Nations to you. I enclose herewith a detailed response to the specific points made by the Permanent Representative (see annex).

The United Kingdom Government attaches great importance to the principle of self-determination as set out in Article 1.2 of the Charter of the United Nations and article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. That principle underlies our position on the Falkland Islands.

It is of deep regret to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Falkland Islands Government that the Government of Argentina continues to deny that these fundamental human rights apply to the people of the Falkland Islands, and continues to act in ways which go against the principles established in the United Nations Charter.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44.

(*Signed*) Mark **Lyall Grant**

14-23352 (E) 200214

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 10 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland recalls its letter to the Secretary-General of 17 January 2013 (A/67/703).

The United Kingdom is clear about both the historical and legal positions on the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. No civilian population was expelled from the Falkland Islands on 3 January 1833. An Argentine military garrison had been sent to the Falkland Islands three months earlier in an attempt to impose Argentine sovereignty over British sovereign territory. The United Kingdom immediately protested and later expelled the Argentine military garrison on 3 January 1833. The civilian population, who had previously sought and received British permission to reside on the Islands, were encouraged to remain. The majority voluntarily chose to do so. In 1833, the territorial borders of the Republic of Argentina did not include the geographical southern half of its present form, nor any territory in the Falkland Islands, Antarctica or South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands.

British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands dates back to 1765, some years before the Republic of Argentina even existed. The United Kingdom has never implanted any civilian population; all civilians have voluntarily migrated to, or been born in, the Falkland Islands. Civilian migrants voluntarily came from a large number of countries, as they did throughout the whole Americas region, including Argentina, during the nineteenth century. The Republic of Argentina's claim to the Islands, which it bases on the principle of disruption to its territorial integrity, is without foundation, as the Islands have never legitimately been administered by, or formed part of, the sovereign territory of the Republic of Argentina.

The United Kingdom remains committed to defending the rights of the people of the Falkland Islands to determine their own political, social and economic future. The United Kingdom once again urges the Government of Argentina to respect the outcome of the referendum held on the Islands in March 2013 in which the Falkland Islanders categorically made their wishes known to the international community by 99.8 per cent of the electorate deciding to maintain their current political relationship with the United Kingdom. There will be no negotiation on the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands unless and until the Islanders so wish.

The United Kingdom notes that the Republic of Argentina regularly refers to regional statements of diplomatic support for Falkland Islands sovereignty negotiations, including Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly resolutions, United Nations General Assembly resolutions (the last of which was issued in 1988) and resolutions of the United Nations Special Committee on decolonization. However, none of these regional statements or specific Falkland Islands resolutions fully reflects the legally binding principle of self-determination enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, nor the modern relationship between the United Kingdom and its Overseas Territories. Regional statements from OAS and others, or United Nations General Assembly resolutions, do not modify or dilute the obligation of nations to respect the Falkland Islanders' right of self-determination, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

The Republic of Argentina's claims that the United Kingdom is "militarizing" the South Atlantic are wholly false. There has been no escalation in the United Kingdom's military presence in the South Atlantic and those assets which are in place are entirely defensive in nature and have remained unchanged for many years. In fact, the United Kingdom's military presence on the Falkland Islands has been significantly reduced over time. The military presence peaked at over 20,000 personnel in the aftermath of the illegal Argentine invasion of 1982. In the mid-1990s, the figure stood at around 1,800, and since 2002 it has remained at the current figure of around 1,200. It must be stated that the only reason that there has ever been a United Kingdom military presence in the Falkland Islands is because of the invasion of the Islands by Argentina in 1982.

Finally, the United Kingdom fully supports the Falkland Islands Government's legitimate decision to establish and manage a sustainable fisheries industry and to explore for hydrocarbon resources in Falkland Islands waters in full accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and article 1, paragraph 2, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The recent passage of Argentine domestic legislation which introduces criminal charges against any individual or company having any direct or indirect interest in hydrocarbon-related activities in the continental shelf of the Falkland Islands or South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands is considered to be unlawful by the United Kingdom. The continental shelf of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands does not form part of the Republic of Argentina's continental shelf, nor are their maritime areas recognized as part of the Republic of Argentina's continental shelf under international law. It therefore follows that Law 26.659 and any subsequent amendments do not apply to the continental shelf surrounding the Falkland Islands or South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. Accordingly, any attempt by the Republic of Argentina to enforce its domestic legislation against individuals or companies involved in hydrocarbons exploration on the said continental shelf would be contrary to international law.

The United Kingdom, the Republic of Argentina and the Falkland Islands Government have successfully discussed issues of mutual interest in the South Atlantic, such as fisheries and hydrocarbons issues, in the past (during the 1990s and early 2000s). It should be noted that this cooperation continued until the Government of Argentina walked away from the South Atlantic Fisheries Commission and unilaterally decided to withdraw in 2007 from the Joint Declaration on Cooperation over Offshore Activities in the South West Atlantic, signed in 1995. The United Kingdom and the Falkland Islands Government remain willing to discuss areas of mutual interest in the South Atlantic, with the precondition that representatives of the Falkland Islands Government must participate in any discussion of issues that affect the Falkland Islands people directly.

United Nations A/68/748

General Assembly

Distr.: General
11 February 2014

Original: English

Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 134
Programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015

Revised estimates relating to the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015 under section 22, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, and section 33, Construction, alteration, improvement and major maintenance

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

In the present report, the Secretary-General proposes mitigation measures to strengthen the safety and security of United Nations staff at the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, based in Beirut.

In late 2013, under the authority vested in him by the General Assembly in resolution 66/249, paragraph 1 (c), relating to unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for security measures, the Secretary-General initiated a comprehensive blast assessment to be conducted of the United Nations House in Beirut. To that end, a specialist firm was commissioned to perform the blast assessment. The results of that specialist assessment were received on 17 January 2014. The proposals of the Secretary-General arise from the findings of that assessment.

The present report sets out the resource requirements for the proposals of the Secretary-General for the biennium 2014-2015. The actions to be taken by the General Assembly are set out in section IV.

14-23320 (E) 260214

Please recycle

Contents

		Page
I.	Introduction	3
	A. Background	3
	B. Security environment and acceptable risk	3
	C. Blast assessment and findings	4
II.	Proposals	5
III.	Resource requirements	8
IV.	Actions to be taken by the General Assembly	10

I. Introduction

A. Background

1. Permanently headquartered in Beirut, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) has been relocated five times during its 40-year history. The first move occurred in 1976, following the outbreak of civil war in Lebanon, with the relocation of international staff to Amman for one year. The second relocation, to a temporary site in Baghdad, took place early in 1982, pending a third move to its permanent location in Baghdad, in 1983. The fourth move was a result of the Gulf crisis in 1990, when the Secretary-General decided to place all international staff members under temporary repatriation until the end of 1991.

2. Following consultations with the Government of Jordan, the Secretary-General recalled all international staff in August 1991. The arrangement to host the Commission in Amman on a temporary basis continued until 1997, when the decision was taken, at an ESCWA ministerial session, to return permanently to Lebanon. In addition to the five instances when ESCWA headquarters was moved on a temporary or permanent basis, an evacuation occurred during the Israel-Lebanon conflict in the summer of 2006. Staff members were deployed to work from Amman, Vienna and Beirut, as well as from their home countries. Between 2006 and 2008, there were additional instances of partial, temporary relocations to hotels in Beirut.

Beirut as headquarters of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

3. By its resolution 1994/43, the Economic and Social Council decided that the permanent headquarters of ESCWA should be relocated to Beirut from Amman. On 27 August 1997, the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon concluded an agreement concerning the headquarters of ESCWA, by which the Government of Lebanon granted to the United Nations premises in Beirut on a permanent basis as the headquarters of ESCWA, United Nations funds and programmes and specialized agencies. The premises included the installed fixtures, surrounding grounds and parking spaces, and were furnished and equipped by the Government of Lebanon at no cost to the Organization.

4. The United Nations House is rented by the Government of Lebanon from the development corporation responsible for the reconstruction of central Beirut (Solidere). The building is located in downtown Beirut, near the parliament and the office of the Prime Minister.

B. Security environment and acceptable risk

5. Since 2005, the domestic and regional security situation has progressively deteriorated. Crash barriers, T-walls and a state-of-the-art perimeter access control system have been installed and additional security staff posts have been established. Regular security assessments have also been conducted. The extensive measures taken to improve the physical security of the building notwithstanding, both the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon considered that there was a need to relocate ESCWA headquarters to another location in the vicinity of Beirut. In the meantime, the United Nations and the Government of Lebanon have continued to mitigate the vulnerability of the building and its occupants by implementing

operational mitigation measures and have also relocated nearly all other United Nations system organizations personnel previously based at ESCWA headquarters (with the exception of ESCWA itself) to other offices throughout the capital and its vicinity.

6. In May 2009, the Government of Lebanon allocated land that met the United Nations security requirements for the purpose of constructing new United Nations premises north of Beirut. On 28 September 2009, the Ministry of Finance of Lebanon signed an agreement with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants of Lebanon to allocate to the latter adjoining land parcels in Dbayeh with a total surface area of 72,934 m^2 to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations for constructing the new common premises. However, owing to several factors, the Government of Lebanon has still not been able to make the necessary resources available to construct a new building to house the Commission.

7. The security situation in Lebanon in general, and north of the Litani river in particular, has steadily deteriorated over the past few years, owing to various domestic, regional and international factors. An increase in polarization and radicalization in Lebanon, against a background of escalating regional tensions, notably the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, is of particular concern to the United Nations in Lebanon.

8. Given the current national and regional context, the number of serious security incidents has increased. With the introduction of a broad spectrum of terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures, it has been assessed that, while ESCWA is not deemed to be directly targeted at this point, the United Nations remains a potential target in the region.

9. Both regionally imported and home-grown radicalization is on the rise in Lebanon, as evidenced by the recent and sustained series of targeted explosions throughout the country and the capital region. It is assessed that the movement of extremist elements into and out of Lebanon armed with weapons, explosives and knowledge is steadily increasing. The deteriorating security situation within Lebanon, a repercussion of the conflict in neighbouring Syrian Arab Republic and of existing internal political tensions, raises the likelihood of the United Nations becoming a target for parties interested in undermining the reputation of the Organization, the Government of Lebanon or other regional actors.

Relations with the host Government

10. While ESCWA remains committed to pursuing with the host Government the option of relocating from its current headquarters to more secure premises, it is unlikely that agreement on the matter will be reached with the present caretaker administration. It is important to note that even if agreement on the construction of a new permanent location could be arrived at promptly, it would be more than three years before the construction of the building could be completed.

C. Blast assessment and findings

11. By virtue of its architectural design and geographical location, the ESCWA compound is vulnerable both to direct targeting by an improvised explosive device or a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device and to the indirect effects from a

nearby improvised explosive device or vehicle-borne improvised explosive device. The compound is located in the city centre, immediately adjacent to busy public roads.

12. The compound features a large glass facade that is highly vulnerable to blast effects, despite the installation of shatter-resistant film. The window framing system was assessed by a leading international firm in the field to be only partially effective in its capacity to hold the glass in place in a blast event. Additionally, the structural support columns are exposed, with the risk of possible failure in the event of a blast, resulting in the potential progressive collapse of parts of the building.

13. A continuing challenge for this location is the lack of stand-off distance and the existence of public roads around the compound that, although partially closed, remain a major complication in securing the complex.

14. In the light of the above-mentioned concerns, which were raised by the Department of Safety and Security during its security assessment, it was recommended that the performance of the building in the event of a blast be examined by a professional blast engineering company. Given the urgency of the requirement and based on expertise available at Headquarters in New York, the technical requirements for the blast assessment, and the work itself, was directly supervised by the Office of Central Support Services in consultation with ESCWA and the Department of Safety and Security.

15. The contracted company was tasked with performing the assessment. Three types of studies were conducted on the existing building:

(a) A window vulnerability analysis: analysis of the building's glazing in response to threat scenarios;

(b) A blast component analysis: analysis of the building's structural components in response to threat scenarios;

(c) A progressive collapse analysis: analysis of the building structure's response to the removal of a column, regardless of reason, at various locations.

16. The report and the findings of the assessment were released on 17 January 2014. The findings of the report highlighted the performance of the building against a possible blast. A variety of retrofit options were recommended to mitigate the risks identified. Following a review, three options were chosen based on the anticipated level of blast protection and the preliminary feasibility of retrofitting an existing, operational building. The proposed facade retrofits are discussed in section II below.

II. Proposals

17. The findings from the 2013 blast assessment described above also identified a number of structural remediation works that would significantly mitigate the safety and security risk exposure for United Nations staff and the United Nations House in Beirut. While the implementation of these measures can be expected to substantially mitigate current risks and decrease the exposure of ESCWA to the risk of a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, they have to be seen as an interim measure, since possible future increased risks to ESCWA at its current location cannot be fully mitigated. However, as explained below, given all the circumstances, these measures are the best solution at this time.

18. The proposed implementation of mitigation measures aims to provide a response, in the short term, to risks posed by vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. With these measures in place, the impact of such a threat would be significantly reduced. Ultimately, the only effective long-term course of action is a permanent relocation within Lebanon of the United Nations House, with the agreement and full cooperation of the host Government. As indicated in paragraph 6 above, the host Government granted the United Nations land for the purpose of constructing new United Nations premises in 2009; no progress, however, has been made on that initiative to date.

19. As mentioned above, there are significant considerations and challenges to be dealt with in terms of the construction of new premises within Lebanon, which, under the current circumstances, could not be completed in less than three years. Consequently, structural reinforcements are required as an interim measure to mitigate the increased exposure to higher-intensity blasts pending relocation of United Nations House in Beirut.

20. Following the completion of the blast assessment (phase 1) and its findings, the proposed structural remediation project work would take place in two further phases: phase 2, detailed design, and phase 3, construction work.

Phase 2: detailed design

21. The detailed design will include the necessary site investigations, calculations, preparation of construction drawings and testing, as well as drafting of the specifications and bills of quantities required for the procurement and construction phases.

Phase 3: construction work

22. The structural remediation work will consist of the following construction activities:

(a) The replacement of the existing shatter-resistant film on the glass facades. The existing film covering the building's glazing is more than 10 years old; it was installed in phases, starting on the lower floors, in 2001. Given the degree to which it is exposed to ultraviolet light, it will have suffered significant degradation. Shatter-resistant film is generally considered to have a life cycle of about 10 years, depending on meteorological conditions and exposure to sunlight. It should be noted that glazing debris can be fatal or cause serious injury to building occupants and has been the main cause of deaths in explosions affecting United Nations buildings in the past. Shatter-resistant film is considered to be the baseline or minimum fitting required to mitigate the risk of glass shattering into projectiles. Specialized testing could be undertaken during the design phase to determine any portions that might not need to be replaced, but this is expected to be marginal, if any;

(b) The facades would be reinforced by installing cable catch systems, consisting of cables anchored to concrete ceilings and floors above and below the facades. Cable catch systems are used in conjunction with shatter-resistant film and are designed so that in the event of a blast a cable would catch the glass or eject it to the outside of the building. Cable catch systems significantly enhance the resistance of glazing to blast-related hazards on all facades without appreciably affecting the overall performance or quality of the work environment, for example by retaining

access to views and natural light. The effectiveness of catch cable systems relies upon effective shatter-resistant film existing on the building's glazing, as described above. Geotextile stone retrofitting (i.e. using filter fabrics for structural strengthening) would be required in locations above and below windows;

(c) The concrete floors and ceilings, known as slabs, are the most vulnerable structural components of the building. The most practical and cost-effective way to retrofit the structure to fortify these components is to apply fibre-reinforced polymer strips to the slabs to improve uplift capacity. This structural reinforcement is only required for the portion of the building that is susceptible owing to the exposure of the structural support columns.

Project schedule

23. It is envisaged that the structural remediation project can be completed in 44 weeks from the start of the detailed design phase, after allowing lead time for the procurement process, currently estimated at 24 weeks for the construction phase and 4 weeks for the design phase. The overall timeline for the proposed project is 18 months, as set out in the figure below.

Schedule for the structural remediation project as at 3 February 2014


Description
Duration
2013
2014
2015
Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct
Phase 1: Assessment phase
26 Aug 2013 - 22 Jan 2014
Phase 2: Detailed design phase
a. Procurement leadtime – Design
4 weeks
b. Detailed design
8 weeks
Phase 3: Construction
a. Procurement leadtime – Construction
24 weeks
b. Construction
56 weeks

◆ Secretary-General reporting to the General Assembly, subject to Member States decision

Project coordination

24. Should the project be approved by the General Assembly, the project owner would be the Executive Secretary of ESCWA.

25. In line with practices and procedures established for all construction projects at offices away from Headquarters, the ESCWA project team would be supported by the Office of Central Support Services, Department of Management, which would provide technical guidance and advice, including by sharing lessons learned from similar capital projects undertaken by the Organization and senior-level coordination.

26. Regular coordination activities between ESCWA and the Office of Central Support Services would be undertaken throughout the duration of the project. Such

activities would include a review of technical drawings and specifications and a review of administrative and project management procedures, including, especially, a risk assessment.

III. Resource requirements

27. Resource requirements for the proposals described above for the biennium 2014-2015 amount to $7,306,900 (net of staff assessment) of non-recurrent costs. The costs associated with the proposals are summarized in tables 1 and 2 below, by expenditure component and budget section. Resource requirements include the proposed establishment of two general temporary assistance positions (1 P-4 and 1 Local level) and other related general operating requirements, as well as capital expenditure requirements for the structural enhancement work to be undertaken throughout the remainder of the biennium.

28. The anticipated schedule envisages the overall project to be completed in 44 weeks, after allowing for procurement lead times. This would see the completion of all structural remediation work by the end of December 2015.

Table 1

Resource requirements under sections 22, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, and 33, Construction, alteration, improvement and major maintenance, by object of expenditure

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Object of expenditure	*2014-2015 initial appropriation*	*Additional requirements*	*2014-2015 revised estimate*
Other staff costs	1 708.3	380.1	2 088.4
Travel of staff	709.9	15.0	724.9
General operating expenses	3 660.9	4.0	3 664.9
Alteration and improvement	20 532.0	6 907.8	27 439.8
Total (net of staff assessment)	**26 611.1**	**7 306.9**	**33 918.0**

Table 2

Resource requirements by programme budget section

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Budget section	*2014-2015 initial appropriation*	*Additional requirements*	*2014-2015 revised estimate*
22. Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia	70 189.5	399.1	70 588.6
33. Construction, alteration, improvement and major maintenance	75 268.7	6 907.8	82 176.5
36. Staff assessment	486 831.8	53.6	486 885.4
Total	**632 290.0**	**7 360.5**	**639 650.5**

Section 22, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia

Other staff costs: general temporary assistance ($380,100)

29. ESCWA does not have the in-house capacity to oversee the management of the proposed construction activities on a day-to-day basis. In order to secure project completion by the end of the biennium, there is a requirement for a local in-house dedicated project management team comprising a project manager at the P-4 level supported by a Local level staff member funded under general temporary assistance. The project manager would report to the Director of Administration at ESCWA and work in close collaboration with the Chief of the General Services Section and the Chief of the Security and Safety Section. The project manager would assume responsibility for the overall planning, implementation and completion of the project, on schedule and within budget. The Local level staff member would provide overall administrative assistance to the project manager, provide support with respect to quality assurance, monitoring the project risk plan and reporting on related risks, and draft documentation and reports on the project's status.

30. The estimated one-time provision for general temporary assistance for an anticipated project period of 18 months is $380,100.

Travel of staff ($15,000)

31. The proposed resources would provide for two trips during the biennium between ESCWA and Headquarters in New York to consult and report on progress in project implementation.

General operating expenses ($4,000)

32. The proposed resources would cover the one-time provision for office automation equipment ($3,000) and communication ($1,000) for the two staff members on the project team.

Section 33, Construction, alteration, improvement and major maintenance

Alteration and improvement ($6,907,800)

33. The requirements of $6,907,800 would provide for a uniform level of blast retrofits comprising the replacement of shatter-resistant film ($1,258,000), the installation of a cable catch system and geotextile stone retrofit ($4,760,400) and a structural slab retrofit ($536,400), as well as design fees ($353,000) for the security retrofitting work.

IV. Actions to be taken by the General Assembly

34. **The General Assembly is requested:**

(a) **To approve the present proposals of the Secretary-General;**

(b) **To approve the establishment of two temporary positions (1 P-4 and 1 Local level) under section 22, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, of the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015;**

(c) **To appropriate an additional non-recurrent amount of $7,306,900 under the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015 comprising increases**

under section 22 ($399,100), section 33, Construction, alteration, improvement and major maintenance ($6,907,800), and section 36, Staff assessment ($53,600), to be offset by a corresponding amount under income section 1, Income from staff assessment, of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015.

35. The non-recurrent amount of $7,306,900 would represent a charge against the contingency fund for the biennium 2014-2015.

United Nations A/68/749–S/2014/95

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
12 February 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 99
General and complete disarmament

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 11 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to submit herewith a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of Kazakhstan's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 14 February 2014 (see annex).

I would be grateful if you would kindly circulate the present letter and its annex on 14 February as a document of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly under agenda item 99, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ambassador Kairat **Abdrakhmanov**
Permanent Representative

14-23398 (E) 180214 190214

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 11 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: Russian]

Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of Kazakhstan's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Republic of Kazakhstan is a firm and consistent advocate of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. This year, 14 February 2014, marks the twentieth anniversary of Kazakhstan's accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State.

Strengthening the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, including its cornerstone, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, is one of the priorities of Kazakhstan's foreign policy. The danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and also of the materials and technologies required for their production, is one of the most serious challenges for international security, particularly in view of the rising threat of terrorism.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is a key, time-tested international instrument for ensuring global and regional stability. It is important to implement the Treaty in an effective and balanced manner, in line with its three pillars: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Kazakhstan's position is based on the firm conviction that the Treaty's objectives can only be effectively achieved through the joint efforts of States in close collaboration with international and regional organizations, especially the United Nations.

The Republic of Kazakhstan is actively participating in international efforts towards a nuclear-weapon-free world and nuclear safety. Over its 20 years as a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Kazakhstan has taken practical actions that have contributed significantly to the achievement of the Treaty's aims.

The first step in the development of what would become Kazakhstan's non-proliferation policy was the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing site in August 1991. This was the first time in world history that a nuclear testing site was closed at the behest of the people.

In 1995, Kazakhstan withdrew the world's fourth most powerful nuclear arsenal from its territory and dismantled its nuclear weapons production and testing infrastructure.

In 2009, Kazakhstan, together with the other Central Asian countries, established a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, thereby making an important collective contribution to the strengthening of global and regional security.

At Kazakhstan's initiative, on 2 December 2009, the United Nations General Assembly, at its sixty-fourth session, adopted a resolution proclaiming 29 August,

the day the Semipalatinsk testing site was shut down, as the International Day against Nuclear Tests. This will contribute to the global aspirations to achieve peace, ban nuclear testing throughout the world, raise awareness and educate the public on issues of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Kazakhstan calls on all countries and international organizations to observe the International Day against Nuclear Tests.

In addition, Kazakhstan has launched a project called ATOM (Abolish Testing Our Mission), an international petition campaign designed to unite public opinion throughout the world against nuclear tests. The campaign has already received tremendous support from the global community.

Kazakhstan will host the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) international low-enriched uranium fuel bank in its territory. Negotiations on a host country agreement providing for the bank's location are currently being finalized. The development of multilateral approaches to nuclear fuel, including the creation of guaranteed nuclear fuel reserves, will promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

In 2013, in Almaty, Kazakhstan hosted two rounds of the six-party talks with the Islamic Republic of Iran on the Iranian nuclear programme, during which the foundations were laid for further progress in the negotiation process.

Furthermore, Kazakhstan has been actively involved in the work of the Nuclear Security Summits. It is vital to achieve a common understanding of the perils posed by nuclear terrorism and to adopt measures to ensure that nuclear facilities, material and technology are safeguarded and do not fall into the hands of terrorists. Kazakhstan intends to participate actively in the next Nuclear Security Summit, to be held in The Hague in March 2014.

Kazakhstan is a party to all the international instruments on the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. It participates actively in the work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (The Hague Code), the Zangger Committee, the Proliferation Security Initiative regarding weapons of mass destruction, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Global Partnership on non-proliferation.

In order to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, the Republic of Kazakhstan calls upon all States parties to reaffirm their commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to their obligations under that instrument, the decisions adopted at the Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty, and the practical implementation of the agreements reached to ensure the Treaty's universality.

It also calls upon States that have not yet acceded to or ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to do so promptly, with a view to its early entry into force. It is necessary to strengthen the verification regime of that Treaty as one of the most effective tools for ensuring non-proliferation, disarmament and nuclear safety in the world.

Kazakhstan advocates the opening of negotiations and the drafting, without delay, of a fissile material cut-off treaty, which would represent a major step towards nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

It shares the aims of the countries calling for the early development of a convention for the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. The initiative launched by Kazakhstan within the United Nations for the adoption of a universal declaration on a nuclear-weapon-free world is an important means of furthering this goal, as it will express the determination of all States to make steady progress towards the ideals of a world without nuclear weapons. Kazakhstan calls on Member States to support the adoption of such a universal declaration.

Moreover, Kazakhstan supports the establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States concerned.

The early convening of a conference on a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, with the participation of all the States of the region, is critical in order to implement the conclusions and recommendations adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

As an active supporter of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, Kazakhstan assures the States Members of the United Nations that it will continue to make every effort to strengthen peace and international and regional security and stability, and to strengthen the role of the United Nations in addressing global problems and new challenges in the twenty-first century.

The Republic of Kazakhstan stands ready, should the Member States entrust it with such an honour, to serve as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the period 2017-2018, taking responsibility for promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues in the Council's deliberations.

United Nations A/68/750–S/2014/91

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
12 February 2014

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-eighth session
Agenda item 65 (a)
Promotion and protection of the rights of children: promotion and protection of the rights of children

Security Council
Sixty-ninth year

Letter dated 10 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to submit to you the report of the workshop entitled "Children and armed conflict: strengthening the implementation of the United Nations children and armed conflict agenda", convened by the Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein to the United Nations, the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University and the non-governmental organization Watchlist on 12 and 13 December 2013 at Princeton University, United States of America (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 65 (a), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Christian **Wenaweser**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

14-23446 (E) 240214

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 10 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Liechtenstein to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Report of the workshop entitled "Children and armed conflict: strengthening the implementation of the United Nations children and armed conflict agenda"

12 and 13 December 2013, Princeton University, United States of America

I. Introduction

1. The Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein to the United Nations, the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University and the non-governmental organization Watchlist convened a workshop on children and armed conflict on 12 and 13 December 2013 at Princeton University in Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America. The workshop brought together representatives of States Members of the United Nations, including members of the Security Council, offices and departments of the Secretariat (Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), members of the International Criminal Court, academics and non-governmental organizations to discuss strengthening action by the Security Council on violations and abuses committed against children in situations of armed conflict.

2. The workshop comprised a public session on 12 December to introduce a wider audience to the plight of children affected by armed conflict and three closed sessions on 13 December. In the first session on 13 December, experts explored ways in which they could support the joint campaign by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the United Nations Children's Fund to end the recruitment and use of children by government security forces in conflict by 2016. At the second session, participants discussed the role of partners in promoting and implementing the United Nations children and armed conflict agenda. At the third session, they examined other violations and abuses committed against children, focusing in particular on attacks on schools and hospitals.

3. Although participants did comment on accountability for perpetrators, it was not the main topic of the workshop. Recommendations on accountability as related to the children and armed conflict agenda are available in the report of the first workshop on children and armed conflict organized at Princeton University, at which participants considered how to deal with persistent perpetrators (see A/67/794-S/2013/158, annex).

4. The present report provides a summary of the discussions in the sessions and sets out recommendations for strengthening action by the Security Council on violations and abuses committed against children in situations of armed conflict.

II. Campaign to end the recruitment and use of children by government security forces in conflict by 2016

5. At the first session of the workshop, participants focused on the joint campaign to end the recruitment and use of children by government security forces in conflict by 2016, which will be formally launched on 6 March 2014, while Luxembourg holds the presidency of the Security Council.

6. Participants from the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict discussed the intention to launch the joint campaign. It was noted that, in his annual report on children and armed conflict, the Secretary-General had listed eight government security forces (those of Afghanistan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Yemen) for the recruitment and use of children. Of those, the Sudan and Yemen had yet to sign action plans with the United Nations to end and prevent such recruitment and use. The security forces of Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan were considered persistent perpetrators, having been listed for five or more years.

7. Participants took as a starting point for discussion an overview of the progress made by each of the eight Governments towards the signing and implementation of action plans. Noting that there was considerable goodwill among perpetrators to end and prevent violations and that not all perpetrators would respond similarly to the same options, participants sought to identify tools to support the joint campaign. Recommendations for action, summarized below, were identified in the areas of sustained political pressure, national capacity-building processes and sufficient and predictable resources.

8. While participants unanimously expressed their support for the joint campaign, they also noted that the vast majority of the listed perpetrators were armed non-State actors, rather than State security forces. They therefore implored the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General also to promote the adoption and implementation of action plans with armed non-State actors.

A. Sustained political pressure

9. Participants highlighted the need to ensure sustained and coordinated action by all actors in encouraging the adoption and implementation of action plans to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children. The following recommendations were made:

(a) The Secretary-General and his Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict should consider ways of highlighting, in the annual report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict, progress by Governments towards ending and preventing violations against children in situations of armed conflict;

(b) The Security Council or its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict could request specific briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict on progress made in terms of the implementation of action plans;

(c) The Security Council or its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict could request the Resident Coordinator or Special Representative of the

Secretary-General for a specific country to consistently raise the issue of children and armed conflict with the national authorities and to provide a briefing to the Council or the Working Group on progress made in terms of the implementation of action plans;

(d) Member States should promote the adoption and implementation of action plans through bilateral diplomacy at the country level. The establishment of a diplomatic group of friends in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was noted as a positive example that could be replicated in other situations;

(e) Member States should mainstream the children and armed conflict agenda in foreign ministries, defence ministries and development cooperation agencies, encouraging in particular the use of bilateral diplomacy and conditionality on military assistance to listed parties to spur the adoption and implementation of action plans. The Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008, adopted in the United States, was noted as a positive example in that regard;

(f) Following the positive example of the United Nations human rights due diligence policy, which stipulates that support by United Nations entities to non-United Nations security forces must be consistent with the Organization's commitments to international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should consider developing a policy prohibiting armed forces listed for violations against children in situations of armed conflict from contributing troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations.

B. National capacity-building processes

10. Participants noted that, to end the recruitment and use of children on a sustainable basis, Governments must put in place measures to prevent future recruitment. It would not be possible to end violations without investing or building capacity in the areas of rule of law and security sector reform. The United Nations and donors should support the development of child protection legislation including the criminalization of child recruitment and use. The United Nations and donors might also need to assist in strengthening national judicial capacity where the criminal justice system lacked the capacity to effectively investigate and prosecute allegations of child recruitment and use. Long-term assistance might also be needed to establish national processes for birth registration and thereby ensure an independently verifiable proof of age for each child. In that regard, participants welcomed the census in Myanmar scheduled for 2014, which would allow for comprehensive birth registration. Furthermore, they noted that the security sector bore the responsibility for establishing effective processes to verify the age of each new recruit. The following recommendations were made:

(a) Establish an informal technical reference group at the global level to share best practices with regard to the implementation of action plans and invite United Nations agencies, the Member States concerned, regional and subregional organizations and arrangements, donors, non-governmental organizations and academics to participate therein;

(b) Promote bilateral cross-country learning regarding the implementation of action plans, for example through facilitating intercountry visits between governmental child protection focal points;

(c) Use a midterm review to evaluate progress towards the implementation of action plans. Participants noted the important role of a midterm review through which government officials could meet members of the United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting and evaluate progress made towards the implementation of action plans. The outcome of the review could be used as a road map towards the finalization of action plans;

(d) Develop road maps for all countries having signed action plans with the United Nations to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children. Participants noted that short, action-oriented road maps had recently been developed in Afghanistan and Chad in an effort to establish clear and measurable benchmarks towards implementation, allowing donors, Governments and United Nations country teams to prioritize and focus interventions;

(e) On the side of the Government concerned, establish an interministerial committee to coordinate the implementation of the action plan;

(f) On the side of the Government concerned, establish a child protection focal point within the security forces to facilitate communication with the United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting and coordinate follow-up on action plan commitments and their implementation.

C. Sufficient and predictable resources

11. Participants noted that sustainably ending and preventing grave violations against children required sufficient and predictable resources. In that regard, the following recommendations were made:

(a) The donor community must address the critical need for sufficient and predictable resources to end and prevent grave violations and implement action plans. For example, consideration should be given to establishing a trust fund for action plan implementation as a flexible funding mechanism, at either the global or the country level, which would provide funding to the Governments concerned, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organizations upon the adoption of an action plan;

(b) The donor community could connect with multilateral funding agencies, including the World Bank, to discuss funding options specifically targeting the release and long-term reintegration of children formerly associated with armed security forces and armed groups;

(c) At the country level, the donor community could support national information campaigns organized by the Governments concerned with a view to widely disseminating action plan commitments among the military rank and file and the general population.

III. Role of partnerships in promoting the children and armed conflict agenda

12. At the second session of the workshop, participants focused on the role of partners in promoting and implementing the children and armed conflict agenda. First, they discussed the role of regional and subregional organizations and arrangements, noting that the growing involvement of such organizations and

arrangements in conflict mediation and peacekeeping operations brought to the fore a wide range of child protection challenges, from ensuring that troops upheld international humanitarian law in the conduct of military operations to handling children associated with armed forces and armed groups. The European Union discussed its commitment to children and armed conflict, including its development and use of guidelines on the subject as a basis for a coordinated approach across all European Union instruments, including development aid, humanitarian assistance and external action (including civilian and military missions executed under the Common European Security and Defence Policy). It was noted that, in September, the Peace and Security Department of the African Union Commission had signed a declaration of intent with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict to step up measures to protect children affected by armed conflict. Other regional and subregional organizations and arrangements identified as potential future partners included the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Participants explored ways to improve the protection of children through partnerships with regional and subregional organizations and arrangements. The following recommendations were made:

(a) Encourage regional and subregional organizations and arrangements to develop guidelines to protect children affected by armed conflict, in addition to a programme of work, and appoint a high-level focal point, with the aim of mainstreaming the protection of children in all actions and in particular all peace and security activities. The programme of work should also include an effort to align national legislation with regional and international child rights;

(b) Given that regional and subregional organizations and arrangements are increasingly involved in peacekeeping operations and civilian or military training missions, the development of improved and harmonized training programmes on child protection for troop-contributing countries should be a priority;

(c) Encourage cooperation between United Nations country task forces on monitoring and reporting and other international entities engaged in ending violations against children present in the country concerned, including but not limited to the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization, with a view to including them in the task forces;

(d) Encourage cooperation between United Nations country task forces on monitoring and reporting and delegations of regional and subregional organizations and arrangements present in the country concerned, including but not limited to the European Union, the African Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

13. In the second half of the session, Watchlist focused on the role of national partners, including Member States not affected by the issue, in promoting the children and armed conflict agenda. It was suggested that Member States should be encouraged to make specific commitments, such as providing financial support for the implementation of action plans or child protection training for troop-contributing countries. Subsequently, bearing in mind the differences between Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security and Council resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict, Watchlist explored the scope for using national action plans under the former resolution as a strategy to

promote the implementation of the children and armed conflict agenda. It was noted that, in 2004, the Council had welcomed the efforts of Member States in implementing resolution 1325 (2000) at the national level, including through the development of national action plans (see S/PRST/2004/40). Any country, including those not directly affected by the issue, could develop a national action plan as a basis for a coordinated approach across its various government departments.

14. Regarding the national action plans, participants noted that there was distinct added value in finding ways to engage Member States not directly affected by the issue. They noted that national action plans raised the level of coordination and information exchange between government departments, something that was considered a vital step because it allowed commitments to turn into action. It was pointed out that many countries also involved civil society in the formulation of the plans, thus offering a platform for continuous civil society engagement. Participants also noted, however, that the plans were often perceived as burdensome, bureaucratic processes. Other flaws included the absence of specific and realistic goals, objectives and priority actions, clear timelines and a dedicated budget. Such flaws had contributed to slowness in implementation at the country level, it was said.

15. Participants also discussed the Paris Commitments to protect children from unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces or armed groups and the Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (Paris Principles), on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of children associated with armed groups. They said that, during the seventh anniversary Ministerial Follow-up Forum to the Paris Commitments and Paris Principles, additional countries could be encouraged to endorse the Commitments and Principles and to support the joint campaign to end the recruitment and use of children by government security forces in conflict by 2016.

IV. Addressing other violations: attacks on schools and hospitals

16. At the third session of the workshop, participants looked at ending and preventing other violations committed against children in situations of armed conflict, focusing specifically on attacks on schools and hospitals, the Security Council having expanded the triggers of the United Nations-led monitoring and reporting mechanism in 2011 to include such attacks. First, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict provided information on guidance under development on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1998 (2011). The International Committee of the Red Cross presented the project that it was leading on health care in danger. Lastly, the Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack introduced the draft Lucens guidelines for protecting schools and universities from military use during armed conflict, drawn up with the aim of reducing such use and of minimizing the negative impact of armed conflict on students' safety and education. It was noted that they were intended to serve as guidance for those involved in the planning and execution of military operations in relation to decisions over the use and targeting of institutions dedicated to education. Participants then discussed how to support such efforts in encouraging parties to conflict to end and prevent attacks on schools and hospitals, recommending that Member States should consider endorsing the draft Lucens guidelines for protecting schools and universities from military use during armed

conflict and, where appropriate, integrate them into military training manuals and standard operating procedures.

V. Recommendations

17. Based on the discussions in the three sessions of the workshop, the following key recommendations were identified for taking action to strengthen the implementation of the children and armed conflict agenda:

A. Recommendations to the Security Council and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict

(a) Request specific briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict on progress made in terms of the implementation of action plans;

(b) Request the Resident Coordinator or Special Representative of the Secretary-General for a specific country to provide a briefing on progress made in terms of perpetrators active in the country and the implementation of an action plan, as well as to request the Resident Coordinator or Special Representative of the Secretary-General for a specific country to consistently raise the issue of children and armed conflict with the national authorities;

(c) Request the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict to continue to promote the adoption of action plans by armed non-State actors.

B. Recommendations to the Secretary-General and his Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict

(a) Consider ways of highlighting, in the annual report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict, progress by Governments towards ending and preventing violations against children in situations of armed conflict;

(b) Mainstream the use of midterm reviews to evaluate progress made in terms of the implementation of action plans to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children for all countries that have signed such plans with the United Nations;

(c) Mainstream the use of road maps with clear and measurable benchmarks to expedite the implementation of action plans;

(d) Establish an informal technical reference group at the global level to share best practices on the implementation of action plans and to promote cross-country learning;

(e) Following the example of the United Nations human rights due diligence policy, consider developing a Department of Peacekeeping Operations policy that would prohibit government security forces listed for violations against children in situations of armed conflict from contributing troops to peacekeeping operations.

C. Recommendations to Member States

(a) Mainstream the children and armed conflict agenda in foreign ministries and related government agencies, encouraging in particular the use of bilateral

diplomacy and conditionality on military assistance to spur the adoption and implementation of action plans;

(b) Establish a group of friends at the country level in all countries with listed parties, in particular in all eight countries in which the government security forces have been listed for recruitment and use of children, so as to support the adoption and implementation of action plans through bilateral diplomacy;

(c) Support national efforts to strengthen capacity to protect children, including the development of legislation criminalizing violations against children, the strengthening of investigative and prosecutorial capacities and the promotion of birth registration and age verification processes;

(d) Consider endorsing the draft Lucens guidelines for protecting schools and universities from military use during armed conflict and, where appropriate, integrate them into military training manuals and standard operating procedures.

D. Recommendations to regional and subregional organizations and arrangements

(a) Develop guidelines and a programme of work to mainstream the children and armed conflict agenda in all actions, in particular with the aim of including the protection of children in all relevant peace and security activities;

(b) Establish a high-level focal point on children and armed conflict in all regional and subregional organizations and arrangements;

(c) Accord priority to the development of improved and harmonized training programmes on child protection for troop-contributing countries.

E. Recommendation to donors

Address the critical need for sufficient and predictable resources to implement action plans, such as by considering, with the United Nations, the establishment of a trust fund for action plan implementation, as a flexible funding mechanism, at the global or country level, which would provide funding upon the adoption of an action plan.